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Increasing demand for valuation of ecosystem services has led stated preference
methods to be applied to public goods that are increasingly complex and
unfamiliar. Traditionally, stated preference surveys were conducted via mail
or face-to-face interviews, but over the past two decades internet panels have
been used to a larger extent. As we move away from traditional methods of
survey administration it is apparent that we need a better understanding of how
“new” survey administration modes influence elicited preferences, particularly
when the environmental good under valuation is complex and unfamiliar.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that people have well defined preferences over
goods for which they have no experience consuming, and evidence suggests
that preferences for such goods are constructed during the survey itself. This
highlights the importance of information and, by extension, familiarity and
knowledge, for people to accurately state their preferences. When analyzing
discrete choice data, one of the underlying assumptions is that people are
rational utility maximizers, however, mounting evidence show that respondents
in discrete choice experiments use simplifying strategies and decision heuristics
to reduce the cognitive burden of the choice task. This type of boundedly
rational behavior is likely to increase when the environmental good is complex
and unfamiliar. This thesis addresses some of the challenges practitioners face
when valuing complex and unfamiliar public goods.
In the first paper I compare two identical discrete choice experiments (DCEs)
aimed at eliciting the Norwegian population’s preferences for increased cold-
water coral protection, an environmental good that is considered both complex
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and unfamiliar. This is the reason why the first DCE was implemented in a
series of valuation workshops and why we created videos to secure identical
information and provide the same visual impact when conducting the DCE
using a probability based internet panel. Our results show that it is possible to
use internet panels when the environmental good is complex and unfamiliar, but
that practitioners should pay close attention to information provision, emphasize
consequentiality and implement procedures to reduce speeding behavior. In
the second paper I explore the link between knowledge (familiarity) about
the environmental good measured by a quiz on cold-water coral, and the
probability that a respondent ignores one or more attributes on the choice card.
We find that respondents scoring above the average on the quiz, a measure
of high knowledge, is associated with a higher probability of attending to the
non-cost attributes (although only significant for one) and a significantly lower
probability of attending to the cost attribute, irrespective of whether they
knew how well or how badly they did on the quiz. These results show that
understanding what type of information affects the degree to which respondents
ignore attributes, and in which direction, is crucial to reduce attribute non-
attendance behavior and obtain more precise estimates. In the third paper, I
identify a group of dishonest respondents who have lied on a follow-up question.
I hypothesize that these respondents have spent less effort on the choice tasks
and as such have a less deterministic choice process (from a practitioners
point of view) and are more likely to ignore attributes. The results show that
dishonest respondents are more likely to be in a scale class characterized by a
relatively higher error variance and more likely to ignore the non-cost attributes
(significant for two out of four). Furthermore, the results suggest that observed
difference in error variance between honest and dishonest respondents can
partly be explained by different propensities to ignore attributes. As such, this
thesis addresses some of the challenges associated with using DCEs to value
complex and unfamiliar goods.
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“Biodiversity in all its dimensions – the quality, quantity and
diversity of ecosystems, species and genes – needs to be preserved
not only for societal, ethical or religious reasons but also for the
economic benefits it provides to present and future generations. We
should aim to become a society that recognizes, measures, manages
and economically rewards responsible stewardship of its natural
capital.” – Sukhdev et al. (2010, p. 29)
As the demand for valuation of ecosystem services is increasing (Sukhdev et al.,
2010), stated preference methods have been applied to increasingly complex
and unfamiliar environmental goods (see e.g. Aanesen et al., 2015; Jobstvogt
et al., 2014). Traditionally, stated preference surveys were conducted via mail
or face-to-face interviews, but in recent years practitioners have turned to the
internet (see Lindhjem and Navrud, 2011, for an overview)1. It is apparent that
we need a better understanding of how new survey modes influence elicited
preferences, particularly when the good under consideration is unfamiliar and
complex. This is what motivated the investigations undertaken in Paper I,
where we compare two discrete choice experiments2 (DCEs) aimed at eliciting
the Norwegian population’s preferences for increased protection of cold-water
coral (CWC). One DCE was implemented in a series of valuation workshops,
1I provide brief background on survey modes in Section 1.1.
2A discrete choice experiment is a stated preference technique in which respondents are
asked to choose between two or more alternatives described by multiple attributes taking
on different levels. Often respondents are asked to answer several such choice tasks. I




and the other using a probability based internet panel. One of the challenges
practitioners face when attempting to value unfamiliar goods is that it is
unlikely that people have well defined preferences over goods for which they
have no direct experience consuming, and that preferences for these goods
are constructed during the survey itself (see e.g. Schkade and Payne, 1994).
Consequently, providing balanced and understandable information about the
environmental good and choice task is crucial for people to accurately state
their preferences (Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006). This is the reason why
the first DCE was implemented in a series of valuation workshops (Aanesen
et al., 2015). To address the issue of information provision3, we created
videos to use in the internet survey to ensure that all respondents received
identical information and to give the same visual impact as in the valuation
workshops. It is well known that stated preference surveys are susceptible
to hypothetical bias4 and recent evidence suggests that a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition for incentive compatibility is the idea of consequential
survey questions (Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012). In our
comparison we explore whether respondents in the two DCEs had different
beliefs about the consequentiality of the survey instrument. In addition,
practitioners are concerned with “professional” respondents and speeders (i.e.
respondents who quickly advance through the survey to obtain the incentive
offer) in internet panels, which could influence results (see e.g. Börger, 2015;
Hess and Stathopoulos, 2013; Windle and Rolfe, 2011). In Paper I we address
these issues and further the line of inquiry into survey administration modes
and in particular asses the suitability of using internet panels when the good is
complex and unfamiliarity is large.
When analyzing discrete choice data, one of the underlying assumptions is that
people are rational utility maximizers. However, mounting evidence suggests
that people are boundedly rational (Simon, 1955) and tend to fall back on
3In Section 1.2 I provide a brief background on the role of information, experience and
knowledge in economic decision-making.
4I discuss this in more detail in Section 1.3
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decision heuristics and use simplifying strategies (see e.g. Hess et al., 2012;
Hensher et al., 2005). It is reasonable to assume that this type of behavior is
more prevalent when the good under consideration is complex and unfamiliar. In
Paper II we take a closer look at the connection between knowledge (familiarity)
and the use of one such strategy: attribute non-attendance (AN-A), which is
simply to ignore one or more of the attributes on the choice cards (Campbell
et al., 2011; Scarpa et al., 2012; Hensher et al., 2005)5. Specifically, we
hypothesize that knowledge about the environmental good affects the degree
to which a respondent ignores attributes. As such, this paper explores one
possible reason for why respondents simplify in this manner and adds to this
literature (see e.g. Alemu et al., 2013).
As touched upon above, the hypothetical nature of stated preference surveys
might lead respondents to over- or under-state their willingness-to-pay, and this
bias is the source of much criticism against using stated preference techniques.
Recent advances in the pursuit of reducing hypothetical bias has opened up for
other interesting hypotheses to be tested. A few studies show that swearing an
oath to be truthful and answer honestly prior to the valuation task can be very
effective in reducing or eliminating hypothetical bias (see e.g. Jacquemet et al.,
2013; Carlsson et al., 2013). One possible reason is that the oath works as a
commitment device and induce respondents to spend more effort and deliberate
more carefully on their preferences during the valuation task (Carlsson et al.,
2013). In Paper III I identify a group of dishonest respondents who have lied
on a follow-up question and hypothesize that these respondents have spent
less effort on the choice task. While I can only speculate as to why some
respondents have lied, I nonetheless hypothesize that these individuals have
spent less effort on the choice tasks and as such have a less deterministic choice
process (as seen from a practitioners point of view) and are more likely to
simplify by ignoring one or more attributes on the choice cards.
5I cover attribute non-attendance in more detail in Section 1.4
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1.1 Survey administration mode
The choice of survey administration mode is not a decision to be taken lightly,
since each type comes with its own advantages and disadvantages (Bateman
et al., 2002). In the remaining part of this thesis, I will make the distinction
between self-administered and moderator/interviewer-administered surveys. In
the former category, we find surveys sent out by mail using postal addresses or
sent out by e-mail using internet panels (opt-in or probability based), while
in the latter we find face-to-face and telephone interviews, and valuation
workshops. Both mail- and internet surveys are relatively cheap and allow
respondents to answer from the comfort of their own homes, but they tend
to suffer from low response rates. However, where mail surveys are limited in
their use of visual aids in providing information, internet surveys come into
their own with the possibility of using enhanced graphics, interactive screens
and videos (Bateman et al., 2002; Lindhjem and Navrud, 2011). Face-to-face
interviews, on the other hand, are known to be highly flexible, allowing for
greater use of visual aids and providing opportunities to probe and motivate
respondents. But getting a high enough response rate is expensive and the
possibility of interviewer- or social desirability bias could severely affect results
(Bateman et al., 2002; Norwood and Lusk, 2011). However, the face-to-face
interview was endorsed as the “golden standard” for administering CV surveys
used in damage assessment by the NOAA-panel (Arrow et al., 1993). In a
valuation workshop, respondents are usually recruited by phone and invited to
a central location to participate in a valuation exercise (Álvarez-Farizo et al.,
2007; Macmillan et al., 2002). Like face-to-face interviews, valuation workshops
are highly flexible and allow for greater use of visual aids, however, it is a
time-consuming and expensive way to collect data.
The multitude of available survey modes have prompted researchers to investi-
gate to what degree elicited preferences, and willingness-to-pay, differ between
them (see e.g. Lindhjem and Navrud, 2011; Windle and Rolfe, 2011; Olsen,
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2009; Bell et al., 2011). In this thesis I will limit myself to focus on a few studies
comparing internet panels with more traditional survey administration modes.
For example, Olsen (2009) compares a mail-out and an internet survey, and
find no significant difference in willingness-to-pay to protect landscape from
road-encroachment when building new motorways in Denmark. Windle and
Rolfe (2011) compare a paper-based drop-off/pick-up approach with an internet
survey, and they too find no difference in WTP for improving the environmental
condition of the Great Barrier Reef. These are only two studies, but Lindhjem
and Navrud (2011), in their review paper, find that internet surveys tend to
elicit equal or lower WTP compared to more traditional survey modes. This is
in fact also the result we obtain in Paper I where we find that willingness-to-pay
is significantly lower in the internet survey. As I have highlighted elsewhere
in this thesis, providing balanced and proper information prior to a valuation
task is important for people to accurately state their preferences. The ease of
providing information differs between survey modes, which is why the choice
of survey mode should take into consideration the complexity and familiarity
of the environmental good to be valued. It was the provision of information
that was the reason why the first DCE was implemented using a series of
valuation workshops, and why we created videos to use online. As such this
thesis furthers the line of inquiry into the effect of survey administration modes
to provide greater insights into the suitability of using internet panels when
the environmental good is unfamiliar and complex.
1.2 The role of information
When thinking about the influence of information on stated preferences it
is useful, and indeed important, to consider the source of an individual’s
information set. In this thesis, following the distinction made by Cameron and
Englin (1997), we consider exogenous and endogenous information leading to
objective and subjective knowledge, respectively. Exogenous information is
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typically provided by the survey instrument (or moderator/interviewer) and
endogenous information is acquired through experience with the good. Input
from both sources determines an individual’s information set and her knowledge
about the environmental good under consideration. The analysis in this thesis
makes no attempt at separating the two sources of information, although it is
reasonable to assume that the information a respondent has about cold-water
corals was provided exogenously by the moderator in the valuation workshops
or video online. This is mainly because most cold-water coral live between
200 - 400 meters below sea level, which makes them inaccessible. I cover this
assumption in detail in Papers I and II, and in Chapter 4.
The role of information and experience in economic decision-making has been
of interest to researchers for decades, and it has also made its way into stated
preference research. For an overview of early contributions to this literature,
I refer the reader to Munro and Hanley (2001). For example, Cameron and
Englin (1997) find that direct experience with fishing, a type of subjective
knowledge, significantly increase the willingness-to-pay for a doubling of the
trout abundance in the North East United States. A similar result was obtained
by Carlsson and Martinsson (2006), who found that direct experience with
longer power outages, resulting from a strong hurricane in Sweden, significantly
increased the probability of stating a positive willingness-to-pay to avoid power
outages in the future. Recently, it has been suggested that people behave
consistent with Bayesian updating when new information is made available.
In particular, Czajkowski et al. (2014a) find that respondents receiving more
complete and positive information6 about the consequences of a biodiversity
conservation program (exogenous information), have a more deterministic
choice process as seen from a practitioners point of view. In a different paper,
Czajkowski et al. (2014b) find that respondents having experience with water
quality (endogenous information), measured as number of trips to the beach,
also have a more deterministic choice process relative to those with little or
6For example, positive information emphasize more benefits to other species of increased
conservation efforts, important part of cultural heritage etc.
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no experience. A few studies have explored the role of information on using
simplifying strategies. For example, Hensher (2006) varies the number of
attributes on a choice card, a measure of information load, and find that it is
the relevancy of the information and not strictly the quantity that affects the
degree to which attributes are ignored. Kosenius (2013) use a DCE to elicit
preferences for water quality improvements in Finland and find that proximity
to the water body, a measure of familiarity (experience) is associated with lower
levels of stated attribute non-attendance. In Paper II we measure knowledge
about cold-water coral by a quiz over the material covered in the presentation
given by the moderator in the valuation workshop. As such, our measure of
knowledge does not consider the source of the information. We then use this
measure of knowledge to explicitly test hypotheses related to the connection
between knowledge and attribute non-attendance (this particular simplifying
strategy is discussed in more detail in Section 1.4). A different, but related,
stream of research on cognitive biases in economic decision-making suggests
that individuals with experience trading in a particular market are less prone
to the endowment effect (List, 2011; List et al., 2003), the disposition effect
(Feng and Seasholes, 2005) and the bias of fixed working hours (Camerer et al.,
1997).
1.3 Hypothetical bias
Stated preference techniques are often used to elicit preferences, and estimate
willingness-to-pay, for non-market public goods. In many cases this implies
that the both provision of, and payment for, the public good is hypothetical.
The hypothetical nature of many stated preference surveys leads to questions
of whether the method is incentive compatible and to what degree the elicited
preferences reflect “true” preferences. Indeed, studies show that there is a
discrepancy between what people state they would be willing to pay and what
they are actually willing to pay (Murphy et al., 2005). This difference is often
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referred to as hypothetical bias. For many non-market public goods, ensuring
incentive compatibility by using real payment experiments is difficult, and
hence other methods of reducing hypothetical bias have been proposed.
In a stated preference survey, respondents are often asked to choose between, or
vote on, their most preferred option (policy) from among two or more available
options, where one is the status quo/choose none option. Carson and Groves
(2007) discuss the incentive and informational properties of stated preference
questions and introduce the idea of consequential survey questions. A survey
question is considered consequential if the following assumptions hold: i) the
respondent cares about the outcome of the policy considered, and ii) believe
that the answer they provide can potentially influence the policy maker’s
choice of which policy to implement (Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al.,
2012). Vossler et al. (2012), building on the work of Carson and Groves (2007),
formulates a set of conditions for when single binary choice and a sequence of
single binary choices are incentive compatible. A necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for incentive compatibility is that the question is consequential.
A response to a three option DCE (multinomial) only reveals an incomplete
preference ranking of alternatives. To see this, consider a respondent choosing
between A, B, C. Under the assumption that she chooses A as the most
preferred we can deduce that the she prefers A over both B and C, but we do
not know anything about the preference ordering between B and C. Another
problem when we consider multinomial rather than binary choices is that
incentive compatibility disappears (Vossler et al., 2012; Carson and Groves,
2007). In this situation a respondent is choosing between multiple alternatives,
e.g. policies, and this opens for strategic adjustments. Central to this is
a respondents belief about how the policy maker translates the responses
into action and the expectation of how other people will vote (Vossler et al.,
2012). For example, if a respondent believes that the policy that most people
choose will be implemented, then the choice reduces to a choice between the
two alternatives most likely to receive the most votes (expectation of others
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choices). If a respondent’s most preferred alternative is not among these two,
then she has incentives to choose her second most preferred (to avoid having
the least preferred implemented), which should be among the two in a three
option multinomial choice task. This further illustrates that even though the
question is consequential, consequentiality is not in itself a sufficient condition
for incentive compatibility.
In this thesis I use data from two DCEs where each choice card consists of
two alternatives for increased protection of cold-water coral and the status
quo. Incentive compatibility conditions for such a situation have not yet been
identified, but Vossler et al. (2012) suggest that ensuring compatibility in this
situation likely requires additional, perhaps strong, restrictions on which utility
functions are allowed and beliefs about the preferences of others (p.168). While
the survey questions might be consequential, this does not imply incentive
compatibility. Still, the concept of consequentiality does play a central role
in Paper I, where we hypothesize that some of the observed difference in
willingness-to-pay between surveys is the potential result of different beliefs
about consequentiality. We do find that respondents answering the survey
online are more likely to perceive the survey as inconsequential.
Cheap talk scripts have been proposed as one way of reducing hypothetical
bias in discrete choice experiments. A cheap talk script includes an explicit
discussion of hypothetical bias prior to the valuation task, where respondents
are made aware of the existence of this bias, that people tend to overstate their
willingness-to-pay, they are reminded of their budget constraint, and asked to
vote as if the choice task before them was a real referendum (Cummings and
Taylor, 1999).
Recently, another approach has been developed to try and address, and reduce,
hypothetical bias in stated preference surveys. The oath statement approach
has respondents swear an oath to answer truthfully prior to the valuation task.
For example, “Do you feel you can promise us to answer the questions that will
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follow as truthfully as possible?” (Carlsson et al., 2013) or “I undersigned swear
upon my honor that, during the whole experiment, I will: Tell the truth and
always provide honest answers” (Jacquemet et al., 2013). Swearing an
oath has been found to eliminate, or reduce, the hypothetical bias in both lab
and field settings (Jacquemet et al., 2013; Carlsson et al., 2013; de Magistris
and Pascucci, 2014). One possible explanation is that it induces respondents to
spend more effort and deliberate more carefully on their preferences (Carlsson
et al., 2013). This last approach was a key motivating factor for looking at
dishonest respondents in Paper III.
1.4 The role of heuristics
One of the basic tenets in economic theory is the idea of a utility maximizing
agent with complete information and full knowledge of her preferences. How-
ever, acquiring and processing information is costly, and having fully formed
preferences over unfamiliar goods is unlikely. Consequently, processing the
information presented in a discrete choice experiment, e.g. attributes and
alternatives, for then to match this information to one’s preferences in order
to make an accurate choice is difficult and requires substantial effort. To
reduce this effort individuals tend to rely on decision heuristics and simplifying
strategies (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). In his seminal paper, Simon
(1955) argues that the use of simplifying strategies is boundedly rational in light
of limited memory and cognitive abilities. As such, using simplifying strategies
reduces the cost of making a choice in terms of cognitive burden and effort. In
other words, simplifying the choice situation can be rational considering the
trade-off between effort and accuracy (Payne et al., 1992).
In a discrete choice experiment, the effort required to make a choice is increasing
in the complexity of the choice task and the good under consideration (Caus-
sade et al., 2005; Blamey et al., 2002). Indeed, mounting evidence suggests
Page 10
1.4 The role of heuristics
that respondents adopt a wide range of decision-making strategies, including
eliminating- and selecting alternatives based on the level of one or a few at-
tributes (Erdem et al., 2014; Tversky, 1972), using lexicographic decision rules
(Hess et al., 2012; Rekola, 2003) and ignoring one or more of the attributes
on the choice cards (Hensher et al., 2005; Scarpa et al., 2012; Campbell et al.,
2011). In general, this type of boundedly rational behavior is a deviation from
random utility maximization, which underpins the analysis of discrete choice
data7, and can potentially lead to biased estimates if we fail to develop models
that consider the actual choice process.
While there are many simplifying strategies that individuals may adopt, in
this thesis I focus on individuals ignoring one or more attributes on the choice
card, also known as attribute non-attendance (AN-A) (Hensher et al., 2005;
Campbell et al., 2011, 2008; Scarpa et al., 2009; Carlsson et al., 2010). Two main
approaches have been developed in the literature to identify AN-A behavior:
stated attribute non-attendance and inferred attribute non-attendance. The
former relies on self-reported measures of AN-A, in which respondents are asked
to state which attributes they ignored when making their choices (Hensher
et al., 2005; Scarpa et al., 2012). Inferred AN-A, on the other hand, uses
probabilistic models, e.g. the equality constrained latent class model, to
infer AN-A by making probabilistic statements about the use of the strategy
(Hole, 2011; Campbell et al., 2011; Scarpa et al., 2012). In this thesis, I use
the latter approach. Some authors have called for more research into why
respondents ignore attributes. Alemu et al. (2013) argues that the standard
way of addressing AN-A by forcing zero utility weights on parameters stated to
be ignored is incorrect if we fail to consider the reason why the attribute was
ignored. For example, if a respondent ignored an attribute because it did not
affect their utility, then this represents an actual preference and it is incorrect
to impose the AN-A restriction. In this thesis, I maintain the assumption
that respondents ignore attributes as a simplifying strategy and explore how
knowledge (Paper II) and dishonesty (Paper III) affect the probability of
7This is covered in detail in Chapter 2, including how to model attribute non-attendance
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attending to attributes on the choice cards.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives a general
overview of the methods used to analyze discrete choice data as well as those
employed here, Chapter 3 provides a brief background on ecosystem services
and economic valuation in light of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA) and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) project,
Chapter 4 introduces the data, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings in the papers
and Chapter 6 gives a few concluding remarks.
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In this chapter we will look at some of the foundations and developments
in the analysis of discrete choice data, and in particular how it relates to
discrete choice experiments (DCEs). Keeping the discussion general, it serves
as a starting point for the investigations undertaken in this thesis. A DCE is
consistent with Lancastrian consumer theory in which a good is described in
terms of its attributes, and an individual derives utility from the attributes of
a good rather than the good per se (Lancaster, 1966). Another feature that
makes DCEs particularly attractive is that they are well grounded in random
utility theory (RUT) (McFadden, 1974). RUT postulates that the utility an
individual obtains from the outcome of a given choice is latent and unobserved
by the researcher. In other words, the researcher cannot observe what goes
on inside a given individual’s head. Furthermore, RUT proposes that this
latent utility can be decomposed into a deterministic observable component
and a stochastic unobservable component. The former comprises all observed
characteristics of the choice situation, e.g. attributes of the alternatives, and
the latter comprises everything else influencing choices that is not captured
by the deterministic component of utility. Because the utility an individual
receives from a given choice is random from the researchers point of view
it is possible to make probabilistic statements about the chosen alternative.
Under the assumption that an individual maximizes utility, we assume that
the probability of an individual choosing a particular alternative, from the set
of available alternatives, is the probability that the chosen alternative yields
the highest utility (McFadden, 1974). This implies that an individual trades
off between, and considers, all aspects of each alternative in all choice tasks.
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Consequently, the basis in RUT gives DCEs behavioral implications, which are
necessary to estimate indirect utility functions (Louviere et al., 2010).
It is possible to derive different discrete choice models by assuming different
distributions for the stochastic component of utility (Train, 2009). Typically,
assuming that the stochastic component of utility is i.i.d. type I extreme value
(Gumbel) distributed leads to the conditional logit (CL) model (McFadden,
1974). The models discussed here and those used in this thesis are all based on
this basic model. Since its development, the CL model has been the workhorse
in discrete choice analysis due to its ease of implementation and practical
closed form solution (McFadden, 1974). We need to note at this point that
in any choice model derived based on RUT the deterministic and stochastic
component of utility is linked by a scale parameter (Train, 2009). That is,
the deterministic component of utility is scaled by a factor that is inversely
proportional to the variance of the stochastic component of utility. This implies
that if the variance is large, the deterministic component of utility becomes
small and the choice process, as seen from the researchers point if view, is
seemingly more random. Conversely, if the variance is small, the deterministic
component of utility becomes large and the choice process is seemingly more
deterministic. To identify the model we need to normalize the scale of utility.
In most applied work the scale parameter is assumed constant and equal to
unity (Train, 2009). The purpose of many discrete choice experiments is to
derive willingness-to-pay or welfare measures for a particular good, service
or proposed policy. Willingness-to-pay is defined as the negative of the ratio
between the non-cost attribute of interest and the cost attribute. In the CL
model this calculation is relatively straight forward since it is the ratio of two
point estimates. Another thing to note about WTP is that it is a “scale-free”




While the CL model is widely used it has a limited ability to describe observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, we assume that preferences in the
population for a particular attribute can be described by a single parameter
and that the scale parameter is constant and equal to unity. This implies
that people are “preference clones”. Although convenient, it is hardly realistic
in most cases. Here we focus on a few approaches to address this issue with
particular relevance to the models used in this thesis. We can introduce
observed preference heterogeneity by allowing the preference part-worths to be
interacted with socio-demographic variables. For example, if we believe that
women have a different mean marginal utility for biodiversity conservation,
then we can estimate a separate mean parameter for women to uncover the
marginal effect of being a woman relative to the average. As such, we reveal
heterogeneity in preferences between men and women. Now I will introduce
two approaches to uncover unobserved preference heterogeneity. First, I will
discuss the mixed logit model, and this will be followed by the latent class
models.
A mixed logit model is powerful in that it allows for the modeling of flexible
preference structures using continuous distributions to describe how preferences
vary in a population (Revelt and Train, 1998; Train, 2009). When applying
a mixed logit model, the researcher assumes that preferences for a particular
attribute follow a pre-specified distribution, and estimates the population
parameters describing this distribution. In general, any distribution is possible,
but the most common are normal and log-normal, but uniform and triangular
have also been used (Train, 2009). Deciding on which distribution is appropriate
to describe preferences in the population remains a challenge. When deciding
which distribution to use a researcher can use economic theory as a guide.
For example, if preferences are assumed to have the same sign for all people,
e.g. cost, then the log-normal or constrained triangular are reasonable choices.
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Both distributions have advantages and disadvantages in terms of describing
preferences. The constrained triangular, for example, is symmetric around
the mean and bounded by the spread, which is constrained to be less than
or equal to the mean. This tends to give well behaved willingness-to-pay
functions that have defined moments, but the behavioral realism of such a
distribution of preferences can be questioned. The log-normal distribution is
perhaps the most popular choice for the cost attribute. This distribution is
unbounded and as such can lead to extreme coefficients for some individuals
and in some instances force a large mass of the distribution close to zero that
might cause rather large willingness-to-pay estimates. Choosing distributions
for attributes other than cost also requires a researcher to think about the
choice of distributions. For example, if some people are likely to gain utility
from an attribute whereas others might have a loss of utility from that attribute,
then a distribution with support over zero might be more appropriate. Again,
using an unbounded distribution like the normal does come with the risk of
predicting extreme values for some individuals. As such, thinking about the
distributions and testing different assumptions is prudent. Another question
that arises when estimating mixed logit models is whether the distributions
of the random parameters should be independent or correlated. In situations
where a researcher suspects that preferring one attribute is correlated (positively
or negatively) with another, it could be worthwhile investigating this possibility.
For a set of parameters assumed to be normally distributed, a researcher can
allow the distributions to be correlated by estimating the off-diagonal elements
of the lower triangular Cholesky matrix. Ultimately, which distributions to
use, and whether they should be correlated, comes down to behavioral realism,
model fit and a researcher’s judgment.
Calculating willingness-to-pay from a mixed logit model is slightly more compli-
cated since the distribution of WTP is a ratio-distribution of two independent
distributions. If we assume, as some do, that the cost parameter remains
fixed, then WTP follows the same distribution as the non-cost attribute. How-
ever, as discussed above, assuming that everybody has the same marginal
Page 16
2.1 Preference heterogeneity
utility of money is behaviorally restrictive and assuming a distribution is more
appropriate. For some distributions assumed for cost; the ratio distribution
has undefined moments (Daly et al., 2012). For example, if cost follows an
unbounded normal distribution then the distribution of willingness-to-pay has
undefined moments1. To see this, the normal distribution has support over
zero, which means that at some point the denominator in the WTP measure
is zero. A perhaps more serious problem with a normally distributed cost
parameter is the behavioral aspect that some people actually prefer to pay
more to paying less, which is contrary to economic theory. One advance,
which has gained popularity is to re-parameterize the utility function such
that the estimated parameters are willingness-to-pay rather than preference
weights. This is termed utility in “willingness-to-pay space”. It allows the
researcher to specify the distribution of WTP directly rather than rely on the
ratio distribution from a model estimated in “preference space” (Train and
Weeks, 2005; Hensher and Greene, 2011). It is also possible in this case to
allow the distributions of willingness-to-pay be correlated.
In a latent class model, we assume that there is a finite number of distinct types
of people in a population and that each type is characterized by a distinct set
of preferences. The researcher cannot observe any given individual’s preference
structure, but she can make probabilistic statements about the likelihood of
a given individual being in a specific class described by a particular utility
function. Usually, homogeneity is assumed within a class and heterogeneity is
captured by variations in the probabilities of individuals being in a particular
class (Greene and Hensher, 2003). One of the benefits of a latent class model is
that it does not require the researcher to make any distributional assumptions
regarding preferences, but rather rely on a finite number of support points.
One of the challenges facing researchers using the latent class model is to find
the appropriate number of classes. Theory is not necessarily a guide and often
the process is one of “trial and error” to identify the optimal number of classes,
1Daly et al. (2012) derives proofs for when the willingness-to-pay distribution has defined
moments and provides a list in Table 1 covering the most common distributional assumptions
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which is determined using a type of information criteria (e.g. AIC or BIC).
To gain insights into what characterizes the individuals predicted to be in a
given class, the researcher can let socio-economic variables enter in the class
probability functions. This provides an idea of whether e.g. men are more likely
to be in class X relative to Z. Latent class models can be particularly useful
if one is interested in identifying particular groups of users of a national park
or consumers of a particular product. A recent development by Greene and
Hensher (2013) relaxes the assumption of homogeneity within classes. They
propose to use mixed logit models to describe preferences within each class to
reveal additional layers of heterogeneity.
The models outlined is this section do not have the convenient closed form
solution that the CL has. Instead, we approximate the integrals using simulation
techniques (Train and Weeks, 2005). In the case of the “willingness-to-pay
space” and latent class models, the simulation process might end up in a local
maximum. To overcome this particular problem it is prudent to estimate
the models multiple times with starting vectors chosen at random to increase
the certainty of reaching a global maximum. As indicated by the discussion
above, each of the models have their strengths and their weaknesses, and
ultimately the choice of models is at the discretion of the researcher and should
depend on the hypotheses she wishes to test. In Paper I we estimate a model
in “willingness-to-pay space” and allow for relative scale differences between
datasets to consider possible unobserved differences that might arise when
combining different sources of preference data (Train and Weeks, 2005; Louviere
et al., 1999).
2.2 Scale heterogeneity
The focus on developing models to capture preference heterogeneity, outlined
above, has resulted in researchers largely ignoring scale heterogeneity and
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kept the convenient assumption that scale is constant and equal to unity
(it has not been completely ignored, see e.g. Louviere et al., 1999; Louviere
and Eagle, 2006, and references therein). If this assumption is violated then
the preference weights vary systematically with error variance and we have a
confounding between the preference part-worths and scale (Swait and Louviere,
1993; Louviere and Eagle, 2006). Remember that the deterministic component
of utility is scaled by a factor equal to the inverse of the variance of the
error term (Train, 2009). Mathematically, as the variance of the error term
approaches infinity, the scale parameter limits to zero and the probability of
choosing a particular alternative becomes equal across all alternatives, i.e. the
choice process appears random. As such, the scale parameter is not just a
statistical assumption, but carries behavioral implications (Train and Weeks,
2005; Louviere and Eagle, 2006). In fact, it is unlikely that error variance is
constant and that unobserved factors do influence utility differently for different
people or groups of people (Swait and Louviere, 1993; Louviere et al., 1999;
Louviere and Eagle, 2006). It has even been argued that much of the observed
heterogeneity in preferences uncovered in latent class and mixed logit models
are caused by differences in unobserved factors, i.e. scale heterogeneity, rather
than differences in the underlying preference structure (see e.g. Louviere et al.,
1999; Louviere and Eagle, 2006).
In a latent class framework the preference-scale confound can be particularly
problematic. Here the preference weights can only take on a finite number of
values, and the researcher makes probabilistic statements about the likelihood
that a given individual’s preferences are described by a particular utility
function. Keeping in mind that the estimated parameters confound scale and
preference part-worths, a researcher runs the risk of misclassifying individuals
with equal preference part-worths into different latent classes because they
differ in error variance. Magidson and Vermunt (2008) proposed an extension
of the traditional latent class framework that allows subgroups of respondents
within classes to differ in error-variance, and hence consider scale heterogeneity
within a latent class framework. In Paper III I use a slightly different approach
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and introduce latent scale classes where I probabilistically classify individuals
into classes that differ in scale. Recently, practitioners have developed models
that attempt to separate scale- and preference heterogeneity, for example, the
generalized multinomial logit model(see e.g. Fiebig et al., 2010; Greene and
Hensher, 2010). Hess and Rose (2012) argue that these model developments
fail to fully consider the confounding between scale and preference part-worths
in a linear-in-parameters specification of utility, and as such the result is a
more flexible distributional form and not a separation of scale- and preference
heterogeneity.
2.3 Attribute processing heterogeneity
While there are many simplifying strategies individuals may adopt, in this
thesis I focus on individuals ignoring one or more of the attributes on a choice
card, also known as attribute non-attendance (AN-A). For example, individuals
might ignore an attribute in order to reduce the cognitive burden or because
it is irrelevant to her in the choice situation (see e.g. Hensher et al., 2005;
Campbell et al., 2011; Scarpa et al., 2012). The idea is that if an individual
ignores an attribute, then that attribute had no bearing on the choice made,
and as such does not influence utility. Typically, this is accommodated by
restricting the parameter on the ignored attribute to zero when estimating
the indirect utility function (Hensher et al., 2005). As mentioned previously,
in this thesis I focus on inferred AN-A. Early attempts at inferring AN-A
from the data used the equality constrained latent class model and assumed
that the underlying preference structure could be described by a multinomial
logit model. However, this approach fails to consider preference heterogeneity,
which could result in an over-prediction of AN-A because researchers run the
risk of misclassifying individuals with low preference part-worths into classes
in which an attribute is ignored Hess et al. (2013). To avoid this possible
identification problem, in both Papers II and III I use a mixed logit model to
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describe the underlying preference structure. To accommodate the full set of
possible combinations of attributes being ignored and attended to we need 2k
classes, where k is the number of attributes. For example, with four attributes,
we need sixteen classes. In order to infer attribute non-attendance from the
data we need to include an equality constraint for the parameters across all
classes and specify the non-attendance indicators to be different across classes.
In other words, we assume a common underlying preference structure and only
allow variations of attributes being attended to or ignored between classes.
Then we can interpret the probability of being in a given class as the proportion
of respondents adopting a particular processing strategy (Hole, 2011; Campbell
et al., 2011; Scarpa et al., 2012). If an attribute in a particular class is ignored
then the utility weight is restricted to zero, while the attended attributes are
estimated and take the same value across classes, i.e. the equality constraint
(Scarpa et al., 2009).
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3 A background on ecosystem services and economic valuation
3.1 Ecosystem services and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA)
The deep sea1 comprises 90 percent of the oceans in volume and is the largest
ecosystem on Earth (Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011, 2010). Explorations over
the last century and a half have revealed a great diversity in organisms and
habitats, e.g. sea mounts, whale falls, cold seeps, cold-water corals and hy-
drothermal vents. Still, this “final frontier” for research and resource extraction
remains the least understood biome on the planet (Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2010).
In addition to being a highly bio-diverse ecosystem, the deep sea provides
important ecosystem services such as nutrient cycling, pollution absorption
and temperature regulation (Armstrong et al., 2012). Though remote, the deep
sea is still affected by human activities, which could threaten its ability to
provide the same services in the future. For example, deep water fishing and
ocean acidification caused by climate change pose a threat to cold-water corals
(Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011; Freiwald et al., 2004), and ocean dumping and
other pollution can affect large areas and as it degrades into micro-particles
that are taken up in the food chain (Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011). This has
led some to call for establishing deep sea marine protected areas (MPAs),
also outside of the exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and that in the face of
uncertainty regarding lost ecosystem functions and services, we should adopt
1The deep sea is generally considered anything below the shelf break, usually about 200m
below the surface (Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011).
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a precautionary approach (Barbier et al., 2014). It is important to recognize
that the economic system is dependent on the natural system, and that nature
through its various functions provides important inputs to the economy, which
if degraded or lost might demand costly mitigative or adaptive action.
In 2001, the United Nations (UN) launched the Millennium Ecosystem Assess-
ment (MEA) program to assess the status of the world’s ecosystems and the
services they provide (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Ecosystem
services are defined as the flows of goods and services from ecosystems to
humans, in other words: how ecosystems contribute to human well-being. The
MEA framework broadly categorizes these benefits into four groups: Supporting
services, Provisioning services, Regulating services and Cultural services (see
Figure 3.1). The assessment suggests that as much as 60 percent of the 24
ecosystem services examined, are used unsustainably or being degraded, and
that this could continue unless significant changes are made in current policy,
institutions and practices (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
Because of their very nature, many of these ecosystem services are non-marketed
and essentially “free” inputs into the economy. As a consequence, the benefits
of their existence or loss from their degradation, are not always considered when
individuals, private firms or policy makers make decisions. Sukhdev (2011) calls
this “the economic invisibility of nature”. Consider a policy maker deciding
on a land reform to either regulate an area for development or establish a
reserve to protect it. This decision involves a trade-off between jobs created
and revenues accrued, and the potential loss of ecosystem services such as
bio-diversity, habitats, recreational values and other amenities. If the policy
maker decides in favor of development, she has implicitly put a value on the
ecosystem services lost, which are judged lower than the direct benefits from
employment opportunities and increased revenues. This is implicit valuation on
an ordinal scale. Sometimes identifying these opportunity costs are enough, but
by putting a value on the lost ecosystem services we are making the trade-off the
policy maker faces explicit. Let us consider an example. In Thailand, mangrove
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Figure 3.1 - The Ecosystem Services Framework
forests are converted into shrimp farms that provide local communities with
income and job security. However, it comes at the cost of lost ecosystem
services such as flood- and storm protection, and nursery grounds for fish
species that are important for near shore fisheries (Barbier, 2007). Because
these ecosystem services are provided for free, the cost of their loss does not
factor into the shrimp farmer’s decision to convert a mangrove area into a
shrimp farm. Barbier (2007) shows that by estimating the benefit, or value, of
the mangrove forests, the benefits of preserving them exceeds the net return
to the shrimp farmer. It is argued that not valuing these ecosystem services,
or inputs, creates incentives for over-exploitation and consequently becomes a
contributing factor to ecosystem degradation, which in turn results in loss of
ecosystem services (Sukhdev et al., 2010).
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3.2 Putting a value on nature - The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity (TEEB)
Over the past two decades we have seen increasing attention being drawn to
the value that ecosystems have for human well-being, and the value of the
goods and services they provide. In 1997, Costanza et al. (1997) estimated
that the average value of all the world’s ecosystems and natural capital was
US$ 46 trillion2 per year (2007 US$), a number which was updated to US$
125 trillion per year (2007 US$) in 2011 (Costanza et al., 2014). This type of
valuation exercise, though controversial (see e.g. McCauley, 2006; Norgaard
et al., 1998; Pearce, 1998), is still useful as it represents a push to move from
the “economic invisibililty of nature” to the “economic visibility of nature”.
The total economic value (TEV) framework provides a lens through which
we can study the different dimensions of value (Perman et al., 2011). This
framework recognizes two distinct sources of value: use- and non-use values,
each with its own sub-categories (Figure 3.2). The utility we get, or value we
derive, from ecosystems encompasses much more than direct use values such
as food, fresh water and genetic resources. It also includes indirect use values
like pollination, cultural heritage and protection from natural disasters. In
addition, people might derive utility from knowing that a species or ecosystem
exists regardless of their current or future use3. Option values refers to the
potential future uses or benefits we might have from the ecosystem and can be
either use- or non-use.
When economists value ecosystem services they typically use either revealed-
21 trillion = 1 × 1012
3It is argued that intrinsic value judgments also need to be considered (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 2005). However, this refers to a species or ecosystem having a value in and of
itself, regardless of its contribution to human well-being. Under the utilitarian paradigm, on
which economic theory rests, only humans have moral standing and only human preferences
count, as such intrinsic values does not enter into the equation (Spash et al., 2009). It only
matters insofar as it contributes to human well-being.
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Figure 3.2 - The Total Economic Value Framework
or stated preference techniques4 (Hanley and Barbier, 2009). The revealed
preference (RP) techniques, as indicated by the name, make use of existing
market data and observed behavior to infer preferences, i.e. people “reveal” their
preferences through their actions. Common RP techniques include travel cost
and hedonic pricing. For example, using the travel cost method, a researcher
can observe the distance traveled to visit a national park, fuel costs and entrance
fees paid, and use this “cost”-information to infer willingness-to-pay (Hanley
and Barbier, 2009). Hedonic pricing works differently. Consider two identical
houses that only differ in their proximity to a noisy highway. Using the hedonic
pricing method you would infer that the difference in price for these two houses
is the willingness-to-pay for noise reduction (Hanley and Barbier, 2009). RP
techniques are limited to elicit preferences for direct and indirect use-values
and would be inappropriate if one is interested in non-use or option values (see
Figure 3.2).
4To avoid any confusion, I will, as far as possible, use the common nomenclature proposed
by Carson and Louviere (2011)
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Stated preference (SP) techniques, on the other hand, make use of hypothetical
markets and have people state their preferences for a particular ecosystem
service. In addition to capture use-values, SP techniques can be used to capture
non-use and option values. The two most common SP techniques are contingent
valuation (CV) and the discrete choice experiment (DCE) (Bateman et al.,
2002). In a CV study, a respondent is presented with a detailed description
of a change in the provision of a public good resulting from a proposed policy
(Carson and Louviere, 2011). For example, if the proposed policy leads to a
decrease in the provision of the public good in questions, the CV study could
be framed as a willingness-to-pay to avoid the decrease or a willingness-to-
accept compensation to be indifferent towards the decrease. The question
could be framed as an open-ended maximum willingness-to-pay or a minimum
willingness-to-accept, or a single binary choice whether to accept/reject a
proposed amount. This latter way of posing the question was endorsed by
the NOAA panel, when using CV studies as the basis for damage assessments
(Arrow et al., 1993). In a DCE a respondent is faced with the choice between
two or more alternatives described by multiple attributes taking on different
levels, where the attributes describing the alternatives vary systematically
across individuals.
Many of the ecosystem goods and services of the deep sea are non-marketable
and include values that are distinctly non-use. Therefore, stated preference
techniques are required. For example, Jobstvogt et al. (2014) estimate the
Scottish population’s willingness-to-pay for additional deep-sea marine pro-
tected areas (MPAs). These deep-sea MPAs were to be included in the UK’s
biodiversity conservation strategy. Given that many of the ecosystem services
provided by the deep sea are predominantly non-use, they focused on option-
and existence values. Option values were captured through an attribute de-
scribing the potential for new medicinal products and existence values through
number of protected species. Results of the study shows that the average
willingness-to-pay for the “best” option was in the range of £70 to £77 per
household per year (Jobstvogt et al., 2014). Aanesen et al. (2015) focus on the
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Norwegian population’s preferences for additional MPAs to protect cold-water
coral (CWC) habitat5. They focus on existence- and habitat values of CWC
as well as potential industry impacts from increasing the size of the protected
areas. They find that the average willingness-to-pay to increase protection is
in the range of AC274 to AC287 (Aanesen et al., 2015). In this thesis, I use data
from two DCEs aimed at eliciting the Norwegian population’s preferences for
increased cold-water coral protection. The studies and data are discussed in
detail in in Chapter 4.
5The data from this study is also used in this thesis. Cold-water corals and the discrete
choice experiment are covered in detail in Chapter 4.
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4 Empirical Case Study: Cold-Water Coral in Norway – An
Unfamiliar Public Good
Cold-water coral (CWC) reefs are among the largest biological structures in
the world. These deep sea ecosystems are considered biodiversity hot spots
and are unique habitats for a number of species (Hovland and Mortensen,
1999; Husebø et al., 2002). Although research on the ecosystem functions of
cold-water coral is still limited, some research suggests that they may have
important nursery and refuge functions for some species of groundfish (Stone,
2006; Edinger et al., 2007). In Norway, the stone coral Lophelia Pertusa is the
only known reef-building coral. Large-scale exploration of the sea-bed within
the Norwegian exclusive economic zone, by both research institutions and oil
companies, has revealed the largest known density of cold-water coral reefs and
occurrences in the world, which at the last assessment numbered almost 1100
(Institute of Marine Research, 2012). These corals have been discovered in
waters as shallow as 39m and as deep as 3 383m, but most are found between
200m - 400m (Freiwald et al., 2004; Foss̊a et al., 2002). As such they are
inaccessible to most people. Foley et al. (2010) identify ecosystem services
associated with cold-water coral, for example nursery and refuge functions for
fish, and existence values. Despite cold-water coral reefs’ apparent beneficial
ecosystem services, their existence is threatened by bottom trawling, oil- and
gas activity, waste disposal and dumping, and other pollution (Foss̊a et al.,
2002; Freiwald et al., 2004; Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011). An early study
estimated that 30 - 50 % of known reefs in Norwegian waters were damaged
or impacted by human activities (Foss̊a et al., 2002). Unlike tropical corals,
CWC grows very slowly, only 4 - 25mm per year (Freiwald et al., 2004), making
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such impacts irreversible. Consequently, under the precautionary principle,
increasing protection for these ecosystems is important. Currently, under
Norwegian law, it is illegal to destroy cold-water coral reefs and some areas
are closed to certain types of fishing activities (Armstrong and van den Hove,
2008). In that regard, eliciting people’s preferences for increased protection is
of interest to policy makers.
4.1 Data
The work in this thesis is based on two separate, but related, studies, both
of which explore the Norwegian population’s preferences for increased cold-
water coral protection. Both studies make use of a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) to elicit preferences. In the DCE, each respondent was faced with a
sequence of 12 choice tasks. Each task contained 2 hypothetical alternatives
for increased protection and a status quo alternative, which meant no increase
in the protected area at zero additional cost.
The attributes and levels describing each alternative were selected based on a
review of the literature and expert interviews. Based on the large review and
identification of ecosystem services associated with cold-water corals conducted
by Foley et al. (2010) it was decided that “size of the protected area” to
represent existence values, “raw material in medicinal products” to represent
direct use and option values, and “habitat for fish” to represent indirect values
should be included in the survey. Two of Norway’s largest exports are fish and
oil- and gas, and these industries operate along the entire coast. It is likely that
increasing the size and number of protected areas would impact these industries.
In addition, the aspect of impact on off-shore industry was also considered in the
study by Glenn et al. (2010). Consequently, it was decided to include “attractive
for industrial activities” to capture the social cost of increased protection, and
finally a private cost attribute was included, which was a lump-sum increase
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in annual federal taxes. This version of the DCE was tested in focus groups
with experts and the general public to make sure that the attributes and levels
were understandable and conveyed the correct information (Aanesen et al.,
2015). The three focus groups with experts were conduced at the Institute
of Marine Research with ecologists, biologists and oceanographers, Tromsø
University Business School with economists and marketers, and the Norwegian
College of Fishery Science with resource economists, marine biologists and
sea-food scientists. The two focus groups with the “general public” consisted of
individuals with various backgrounds. While none of the groups opposed any
of the attributes, in general, the focus groups found the choice tasks complex
and the outcome of the discussions was a reduction in the number of attributes
(from five to four) and a reduced number of levels, and as such a reduction in
complexity. The attribute “raw material in medicinal products” was considered
speculative by focus groups, contained a high degree of uncertainty, and it was
difficult to convey the concept of an option value. Consequently this attribute
was not included in the final survey. In the final survey, each alternative
was described by four attributes taking on a limited number of levels. The
attributes and levels are described in Table 4.1.
To reiterate slightly and emphasize each of the attributes, the first attribute:
“Size of the protected area” represents the total size of the protected area if the
policy alternative is implemented, and as such represents the existence value of
cold-water coral. The second attribute: “Protected area attractive for industry”
captures the social cost of the proposed policy. The two industries that are
likely to have the largest impact on CWC, and to be impacted by larger areas
being protected, are the fisheries and the oil- and gas industry. The third
attribute: “Protected area important habitat for fish” picks up whether the
proposed protected cold-water coral reefs are an important habitat, a possible
indirect use value1. The final attribute: “Cost” is measured as a lump-sum
1Given current scientific knowledge it is not proven that CWC is an important habitat for
fish, but scientists have observed that fish congregate on some reefs and not others (Costello
et al., 2005). This attribute, the way it is displayed, reflects this uncertainty in that some























































Table 4.1 - Attributes and attribute levels (adapted from Aanesen et al., 2015)
Attribute Size of Protected area Protected area Cost of the
Level protected attractive important habitat management
area for industry for fish scenarioi
Status Quo 2.245 km2 Partly Partly NOK 0
Level 1 5.000 km2 Attractive for the fisheries Not Important NOK 100
Level 2 10.000 km2 Attractive for oil and gas Important NOK 200
Level 3 Attractive for both NOK 500
Level 4 Not attractive to either industry NOK 1000








increase in annual federal taxes per household per year. We show a sample
choice card in Figure 4.1. The DCE uses an efficient design, where Bayesian
efficiency was determined based on minimizing the d-error (Scarpa and Rose,
2008). The design was optimized for the multinomial logit model and updated
based on two pilot studies to get more precise priors.
Figure 4.1 - Sample Choice Card – Cold-Water Coral Study
4.1.1 A DCE implemented using valuation workshops
The first study took place between February and May in 2013 and was con-
ducted in a series of valuation workshops (Aanesen et al., 2015). The valuation
workshop format was chosen because the environmental good to be valued
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was complex and unfamiliar to respondents. A valuation workshop gives the
researcher a structured environment in which to provide good and proper
information, which is crucial for respondents to accurately state their prefer-
ences (see e.g. Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006). In addition, it provides an
opportunity for respondents to ask questions, and for the researcher to quiz and
question them to gauge their understanding of the subject matter (LaRiviere
et al., 2014). A professional survey company recruited valuation workshop
participants to be representative on age and gender within the selected munici-
palities. The 22 selected municipalities are considered a representative sample
of municipalities within Norway with regards to characteristics such as urban
and rural, coastal and inland as well as general location within Norway. Two
days prior to the valuation workshop, the survey company, based on public
phone records, randomly contacted respondents by phone and asked if they
were willing to participate in a 2-hour workshop on marine resources and that
they would be compensated NOK 5002 to participate. The valuation workshop
itself took place in a central location within the municipality. Once respondents
arrived they were seated in a classroom-type setting. Each valuation workshop
was led by a moderator and an assistant. The moderator was an economist
familiar with the discrete choice experiment methodology and the assistant
was a trained biologist. A power-point presentation and a script was created to
ensure that in each workshop respondents received the same information. The
presentation (and script) was based on conversations with researchers at the
Institute of Marine Research and relevant literature (see for example Foley et al.
(2010), Armstrong and van den Hove (2008), Armstrong et al. (2012), Freiwald
et al. (2004), Hovland and Mortensen (1999)), and included information such
as what are cold-water corals, where can we find them, current status of the
ecosystem, mapping and exploration, current protection and legislation, and
threats facing them. The step-by-step process of conducting the valuation
workshops are described in Table 4.2. Included in the second step was a quiz
containing eight questions about cold-water coral. All information required to
obtain a perfect score was covered in the presentation given by the workshop
2NOK 1 = AC0.1028 (http://www.xe.com – 12-01-2016)
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moderator. Embedded in this stage was a field experiment where respondents
were randomly allocated into two groups, one group received their score prior
to filling in the choice cards and the other group did not (LaRiviere et al.,
2014). After completion of the discrete choice experiment, participants took
part in a study unrelated to the answers given on the choice cards.
Table 4.2 - The steps in the valuation workshop and internet survey
Valuation Workshop Internet
Step 1 Power-point presentation Video presentation
about CWC about CWC
Step 2 Fill in first part of Fill in first part of
of the questionnaire of the questionnaire
including a quiz including a quiz
over the material covered over the material covered
in the presentation in the video
Step 3 Power-point presentation Video presentation
about the DCE about the DCE
Step 4 Fill in the choice Fill in the choice
cards cards
Step 5 Fill in the demographic Fill in the demographic
questions questions
4.1.2 A DCE implemented using an internet panel
The internet discrete choice experiment took place one year later in August
of 2014. Respondents were recruited from a probability based internet panel3
to be representative with regards to gender, age and geographic location. We
employed a sampling quota of 500 respondents4 and the survey company
3We used the internet panel run by Norstat AS, which is the largest of its kind in Norway,
with 80 000 registered members.
43462 individuals were invited to participate, 761 clicked on the link and 500 completed the
survey.
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recruited these via e-mail addresses of registered panel members. The e-mail
invitation was generic and included an invitation to participate in a survey
that would last 25 minutes and that they would receive compensation in the
form of 50 reward points. Reward points can be exchanged for gift certificates
or donated to charity5. To facilitate comparison between the two DCEs we
needed to ensure that information was provided in a manner that was as similar
as possible to the valuation workshop. We ended up creating two information
videos to give the same visual impact of a class-room type presentation and
used the same script as in the valuation workshop to ensure that internet
respondents received identical information. The DCE itself was also identical to
the one provided in the valuation workshop. Clicking the link in the recruitment
e-mail took respondents to the first page of the survey with the first video
presentation. Once the survey was begun, it followed the same process as in
the valuation workshop (see Table 4.2).
51 reward point = NOK 1
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5 Summary of the Papers
5.1 Paper I: Valuing Unfamiliar and Complex Environmental
Goods: A Comparison of Valuation Workshops and Internet
Panel Surveys with Videos
Traditionally, stated preference surveys in general, and discrete choice experi-
ments in particular, have been administered by mail or face-to-face interviews.
Over the past two decades practitioners have increasingly used internet panels
to administer such surveys even for complex and unfamiliar goods. As we
move away from traditional methods of survey administration, it is becoming
apparent that we need a better understanding of how “new” survey modes
influence results. In this paper, we compare two identical discrete choice ex-
periments (DCEs) aimed at eliciting the Norwegian population’s preferences
for increased protection of cold-water coral (CWC). Seeing as CWC is an
environmental good that is both complex and unfamiliar to most people, the
first DCE was implemented in a series of valuation workshops. However, this
is an expensive and time-consuming way to gather data. The second DCE,
was implemented using a probability based internet panel and allows us to
explore how suitable such panels are when complexity and unfamiliarity is
large. To facilitate proper information provision, we created videos to secure
that internet respondents received identical information and the same visual
impact of information presentation. Our results show that estimated WTP
in the internet survey is significantly lower compared to estimated WTP in
the valuation workshop survey. We identify a large number of status quo
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choosers (SQ-choosers) in the internet survey that partly explains this result. A
SQ-chooser is a respondent who chooses the reference alternative (status quo)
with no increase in the protected area at no additional cost in all choice tasks.
Furthermore, we find that respondents scoring below the average on the quiz
on cold-water coral (an indication of knowledge about the environmental good),
respondents who speed through the survey questionnaire, and respondents
believing the survey to be inconsequential are significantly more likely to choose
the reference alternative in all choice tasks. Inspection of the conditional WTP
distributions suggests that part of the observed difference in WTP between
survey modes are caused by these respondents. Taken together, these results
suggests that it is possible to use probability based internet panels to value
complex and unfamiliar environmental goods, but that practitioners should
pay close attention to information provision, emphasize consequentiality and
implement procedures to reduce speeding behavior.
5.2 Paper II: Disentangling the Influence of Knowledge on
Attribute Non-Attendance
Over the past few decades respondents using simplifying heuristics and strate-
gies when responding to discrete choice experiments have received increasing
attention. The main problem is that failing to consider non-utility maximizing
behavior could lead to biased estimates and wrong inferences drawn regarding
preferences and ultimately willingness-to-pay. In this paper we use data from a
discrete choice experiment on cold-water coral protection and seek to disentangle
the influence of knowledge about the environmental good under consideration
on a respondent’s propensity to ignore one or more of the attributes on the
choice cards, i.e. attribute non-attendance (AN-A). The data was gathered
in a series of valuation workshops. In the valuation workshops, respondents
received a presentation about the environmental good followed by a quiz over
the material covered. We use the number of correct answers on the quiz as
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a measure of knowledge. Specifically, we test two hypotheses: One, that the
knowledge about the environmental good affects the probability of attending
to the attributes, and two, that receiving an external signal about how well
you did influences the probability of attendance. Our results show that scoring
above the mean on the quiz, a measure of high knowledge, is associated with a
higher probability of attending to the environmental and ecological attributes
and a lower probability of attending to the cost attribute. This result was only
significant for two out of four attributes, and holds irrespective of whether a
respondent received his or her score. In general, being told your score causes
mixed directional effects on the probabilities of attendance, but these are all
insignificant, indicating that knowing your score does not influence the degree
to which you attend to or ignore attributes. Finally, considering attribute
non-attendance leads to significantly lower willingness-to-pay estimates, a result
which conforms to the majority of findings in the literature. Our results imply
that information, which translates into knowledge, does influence the degree to
which respondents ignore attributes, but at the same time highlights that more
research is needed to know what type of information influence the degree to
which respondents attend to attributes and in which direction. Understanding
this is crucial to reduce attribute non-attendance behavior and obtain more
precise estimates.
5.3 Paper III: Accommodating Respondent Dishonesty in Discrete
Choice Experiments
While stated preference techniques in general, and discrete choice experiments
in particular, are largely considered an accepted method of preference elicitation
for unfamiliar non-marketed goods and services, practitioners are increasingly
concerned with data and response quality. In this paper, we use data from an
online discrete choice experiment aimed at eliciting the Norwegian population’s
preferences for increased cold-water coral protection. We identify a group of
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dishonest respondents who have lied on a follow-up question. Recent evidence
suggests that taking an oath to be honest and answer truthfully prior to a
hypothetical choice task reduces hypothetical bias. It is suggested that taking
an oath works as a commitment device and induces respondents to reflect
more carefully on their preferences indicating more effort is put into the choice
task. As such, we hypothesize that respondents lying on the follow-up question
have spent less effort answering the choice tasks and as a consequence are
characterized by a more stochastic choice process and are more likely to ignore
attributes on the choice cards. Using a combined modeling framework to simul-
taneously address preference-, scale - and attribute processing heterogeneity,
we find that respondents classified as dishonest are more likely to be in a
scale class characterized by a relatively more stochastic choice process, and
are significantly more likely to ignore two out of three non-cost attributes.
Furthermore, our results suggest that observed differences in error variance
between honest and dishonest respondents can partly be explained by different
propensities to ignore attributes. Looking at willingness-to-pay (WTP), we find
that considering attribute non-attendance leads to substantially lower estimates,
and that dishonest respondents, on average, have lower WTP compared to
honest ones.
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The explorations in this thesis have shed some light on the potential challenges
using discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to elicit preferences for complex
and unfamiliar public goods. I have used data from two DCEs aimed at
eliciting the Norwegian population’s preferences for increased cold-water coral
protection. In Paper I we set out to explore how suitable probability based
internet panels are when the good is complex and unfamiliar. We considered the
importance of information provision and created videos to ensure that internet
respondents received the same information as valuation workshop respondents.
Our results show that using a probability based internet panel is possible, but
that practitioners should pay close attention to information provision, emphasize
consequentiality and implement measures to reduce speeding behavior. Even
controlling for this, we found that some differences remained. One possibility,
which we discuss in Paper I, is the presence of a social desirability effect in
the valuation workshop. Although, respondents filled in the questionnaire
individually and anonymously, they were still in a group setting. An interesting
extension would be to include a rigorous test of social desirability bias in the
valuation workshop setting to try to quantify this effect.
Recently, respondents using simplifying strategies and heuristics have received
increasing attention from practitioners. In Paper II we hypothesize that
respondents are more likely to use simplifying strategies when the environmental
good under consideration is unfamiliar and complex. Specifically, we explore the
connection between a respondent’s knowledge about the environmental good,
measured by a quiz, and the probability of ignoring one or more attributes
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on the choice cards. We find that scoring above the average significantly
increases the probability of attending to one of the three non-cost attributes,
and significantly decreases the probability of attending to cost, irrespective of
whether a respondent received his or her score. These mixed results answer a few
questions, but open up others. First, it highlights the importance of providing
information prior to a DCE since information, and by extension knowledge,
affects the probability of attending to the attributes. At the same time, it
underlines that more research is needed into what type of information affects
attribute attendance (non-attendance) and in which direction. Understanding
this connection is crucial to reducing attribute non-attendance and obtain more
precise estimates. It will allow practitioners to implement ex-ante measures
rather than rely on ex-post modeling techniques. We also need to consider that
this investigation was undertaken in the context of a very unfamiliar good, and
it might be that a clearer relationship could be obtained in a context more
familiar to respondents.
In Paper III I am concerned with another type of underlying behavior: dishon-
esty. Motivated by findings that swearing to be honest and answer truthfully
prior to the valuation task induces respondents to spend more effort and reflect
more carefully on their preferences, I hypothesize that dishonest respondents
have spent less effort and as such have a less deterministic choice process and
are more likely to ignore attributes. This is in fact what the results show.
However, while dishonesty is interesting, the way I identify it here it cannot
be cleanly disentangled from speeding or a “decision” to be uninformed. This
provides two clear avenues for further investigation. One, to use a different
measure of dishonesty to see if the results obtained here generalize to a wider
range of measures, as well as beyond the current study; and two, although oath
statements motivated this exploration of dishonesty, within the current study
it is not possible to say that it is indeed the flip-side of the coin. An interesting
extension is to combine the two approaches and run a split sample where one
group does take the oath and another does not. That way, we can truly see
if the oath in fact reduces dishonesty, i.e. fewer people lie on the follow-up
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question, and whether honest respondents are more likely to attend attributes
relative to dishonest ones, in the context of being primed to act honestly and
truthfully.
As such, this thesis explores some of the issues related to valuing unfamiliar
and complex environmental goods as it relates to choice of survey mode, and
attribute non-attendance seen in connection with knowledge and dishonesty.
“Prediction success and good model fits do not equal understanding,
and understanding is unlikely to come from pedantically overly
complex statistical models that demonstrate mathematical and
statistical ability but little understanding of theory and substance.”
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